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Abstract: We present discrete time survival models of borrower default for credit cards that 
include behavioural data about credit card holders and macroeconomic conditions across the 
credit card lifetime. We find that dynamic models that include these behavioural and 
macroeconomic variables give statistically significant improvements in model fit which 
translates into better forecasts of default at both account and portfolio level when applied to an 
out-of-sample data set. By simulating extreme economic conditions, we show how these models 
can be used to stress test credit card portfolios. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Application consumer credit scoring models use details about obligors or potential customers 
that are static.  Such models are used to determine whether an applicant should be granted credit, 
based on data which are collected at the time of application and then remain fixed.  Behavioural 
consumer credit scoring models use both information collected at the time of application and 
behavioural variables, the values of which have changed over time, but which are fixed at the 
time of estimation. Both are cross-sectional models and allow the prediction of a probability of 
default within a specified time window, like eighteen months.  However, models that answer 
more specific questions can also be estimated from credit portfolios, since they provide panel 
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data (Crook & Bellotti, 2009) for a sample of obligor accounts. Panel data allow one to estimate 
hazard models which predict the probability of an event (such as a default) occurring in the next 
instant of time, conditional on the event not having occurred before that time, for any future time 
period one chooses. Unlike cross-sectional models, in a panel model one can include variables 
whose values change over the estimation period. Of particular relevance here are common 
economic risk factors that affect all obligors in a portfolio in generally the same way. For 
example, we would expect that a large increase in interest rates would cause, ceteris paribus, a 
general increase in the probability of default (PD). Time varying behavioural variables may also 
be included.  We call these sorts of models that include time varying covariates (TVCs) 
‘dynamic models’. Furthermore, static models typically only have value in assessing the 
riskiness of applicants and obligors.  However, if we want a complete picture we should be 
looking at the return alongside risk, which requires the use of dynamic rather than static models 
(Thomas, Ho, & Scherer, 2001; Ma, Crook, & Ansell, 2009).  In this paper, we present dynamic 
models of default which include time varying behavioural variables (BVs) and macroeconomic 
variables (MVs), in addition to application variables (AVs).   
 
The inclusion of MVs also enables us to perform stress tests, since extreme economic conditions 
can be simulated and included in the model in order to generate a measure of stressed loss 
(default rates).  Accurate stress tests are becoming increasingly important in evaluating the risk 
to banks, as is evident from the evaluation of US banks (Board of Governors, 2009) and the 
recognition by the Financial Services Authority (2008) that stress testing is a key tool in helping 
financial institutions to make business strategy, risk management and capital planning decisions.  
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Our paper contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, for a large portfolio of credit card 
accounts, we show that including behavioural variables improves the model fit in a discrete time 
hazard model, and that their inclusion improves the forecast accuracy. Secondly, we find that, 
while several MVs are statistically significant explanatory variables of default, this does not 
translate into improved forecasts at the account level. Thirdly, we show that including MVs can 
improve the estimation of loss (default rate) at the portfolio level. Fourthly, using account level 
data, we demonstrate the use of MVs for stress testing and report the distribution of expected 
default rates based on Monte Carlo simulation of economic conditions. 
 
In Section 2, we provide a literature review. In Section 3, we outline the methods we use, 
describing the discrete survival model, our test procedures and the stress testing methodology. 
We then describe our data in Section 4, and present some results in Section 5.  Finally, we offer 
conclusions and a discussion in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several modelling techniques have been proposed to develop a dynamic model of credit (see 
Crook & Bellotti, 2009, for a review).  Thomas et al. (2001) describe how a Markov chain 
stochastic process can be used as a dynamic model of delinquency.  However, the approach they 
describe does not allow for model covariates, although models can be built on separate segments 
to allow the modelling of different risk groups.  They also describe survival analysis as a means 
of building dynamic models, since this readily allows the inclusion of BVs and MVs as time-
varying covariates (TVCs).  Bellotti and Crook (2009) follow this path, using the Cox 
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proportional hazard survival model to model the time to default for a large database of credit 
cards.  They include MVs, but not BVs, as TVCs, and find a modest improvement in predictive 
performance in comparison to a static logistic regression.  We take a similar approach using a 
survival model here, but with discrete time survival analysis.  Discrete survival analysis can also 
be understood as a logistic regression on a panel data set, with the data arranged so that default is 
conditional on no prior default having occurred on that account.  Since credit data are usually in 
the form of panel data, and in particular account records are discrete (e.g. monthly records), this 
is a more natural choice than continuous time survival analysis.  It also has the advantage of 
being more computationally efficient, since probability forecasts involve simple summations 
over time periods, rather than an integration which may be complex when TVCs are included in 
the model.   
 
Discrete survival models have been applied successfully to the analysis of personal bankruptcy 
and delinquency in the USA (Gross & Souleles, 2002), mortgage terminations (Calhoun & Deng, 
2002), and competing risks of foreclosure and sales in the US subprime market (Gerardi, 
Shapiro, & Willen, 2008).  Gross and Souleles (2002) used several different BVs and MVs.  In 
particular, they included the outstanding account balance and repayments, and found that the 
former had a positive affect on bankruptcies, while the latter had a negative affect.  They also 
found that the local unemployment rate had a statistically significant positive affect on 
bankruptcy, which is what we would expect, since an increase in unemployment is likely to 
affect some obligors adversely.  Calhoun and Deng (2002) derived dynamic variables measuring 
the probability of negative equity and the mortgage premium.  Both change over time and have a 
positive affect on default.  They also included the ratio of 10-year to 1-year Constant Maturity 
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Treasury yields, and found it to be statistically significant for models of early repayment.  For 
fixed-rate mortgages, the coefficient increases for higher ratios, with the rationale that 
mortgagors will be moving to adjustable-rate mortgages, in order to take advantage of the short-
term relatively low interest rates.  Gerardi et al. (2008) found that interest rates (the 6-month 
libor rate) and  unemployment rate are statistically significant explanatory variables for both 
mortgage default and sales, with a positive affect on default, as we would expect, and a negative 
affect on sales.  These studies have shown that both BVs and MVs are useful explanatory 
covariates for consumer credit risk.  We therefore extend this work by using these dynamic 
models for forecasts and stress testing.  Ultimately, financial institutions and regulators are 
interested in consumer credit risk models for the estimation of future losses at both the account 
and portfolio levels, either in normal (expected) circumstances or when considering adverse 
conditions.  For this reason, we focus primarily on using the models for forecasting PD and the 
default rate.   
 
The literature on stress testing is growing rapidly. In an early paper, Berkowitz (2000) proposed 
a stress testing methodology in which two separate forecast distributions are generated using a 
risk model: one for normal conditions and another reflecting stressed conditions, based on 
changes in an underlying factor. Our approach is rather different to that of Berkowitz (2000), in 
that we do not choose an initial distribution under stressed conditions; instead, we generate a 
single distribution of expected default rates and focus on the upper percentiles for stress testing. 
 
Stress-testing models may be divided into macro stress-testing models and micro stress-testing 
models. Macro stress-testing models concern the implications of stressed states of the economy 
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for the capital of groups of institutions, and the aim is to examine the capital adequacy of the 
financial sector of an economy in the event of adverse shocks. In contrast, a micro stress test 
relates to a specific portfolio of one lender. Sorge and Virolainen (2006) divide macro stress tests 
into (i) those that relate aspects of banks’ balance sheets to macroeconomic activity, and (ii) 
value at risk models where macroeconomic factors are related to aggregate default rates (not the 
probabilities of default of individual obligors). For examples of balance sheet models, see 
Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa (2010) and Delgado and Surina (2004).  
 
Macro Value at Risk (VaR) stress tests and micro stress tests follow similar methodologies. First, 
a model that relates macroeconomic variables to each other, often a Vector Autoregressive 
Regression model, is estimated. Second, a default rate (macro) or probability of default (PD) 
(micro) model that incorporates macroeconomic variables is parameterised. Third, a 
macroeconomic scenario is chosen and its implications for the distributions of PD (or expected 
loss) are predicted, or impulse response functions are estimated. For examples of such macro 
stress tests, see Breuer, Jandacka, Mencia, and Simmer (2012), Jokivoulle and Viren (2011), 
Castren, Dees, and Zaher (2010), and Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009). 
 
Our work differs from that of others in a number of ways. We are concerned with micro stress 
testing rather than macro stress testing, and we consider account level observations rather than 
aggregate default rates. The data used in our analysis are therefore more granular than the data 
used in almost all other studies. In addition, the vast majority of published macro stress tests 
relate to corporate loans, whereas in this paper we consider credit card loans.  
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Few stress test results for retail loan portfolios have been published. Breeden and Ingram (2009) 
discuss the issues which are involved in the generation of scenarios using a model where the 
default rate of a portfolio over time is explained in terms of a function of the duration time, a 
function of calendar time, and a function of vintage, but they do not present the results of a stress 
test for a portfolio.  Rösch and Scheule (2004) assume a Merton one-factor model and estimate 
loss (default rate) distributions for credit cards, mortgages and other consumer loans in the US. 
Unlike our paper, they use aggregate default rate data and do not include variables which are 
specific to the obligor.  In more recent work, Rösch and Scheule (2008) consider estimating and 
stressing the correlation between PD and LGD. They present an integrated approach to stress 
testing using a risk model with unobserved systematic risk factors and observed economic 
variables, and show that this model can be used to produce plausible stress testing estimates of 
PD, LGD and loss rates for Hong Kong mortgage loans. Their methodology is similar to ours. 
 
Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2006) and Drehmann, Patton, and Sorensen (2005) 
are the only studies we know of that use a methodology similar to ours, but their work relates to 
corporate portfolios and their data are pooled across different lenders.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Discrete survival model for dynamic credit scoring 
 
We treat time as being discrete and adopt the following notation. We denote calendar time by c 
and the date that an account i was opened by ia . Let t be the number of months since an account 
was opened (duration time). The term itd  indicates whether account i defaults at time t after 
account opening (0 = non-default, 1 = default). The term iw  is a vector of static AVs collected at 
   
 8 of 41 
the time of account application and itx  is a vector of BVs collected across the lifetime of the 
account. The term itz  is a vector of MVs, which is the same for all accounts on the same date; 
that is, for any two accounts i, j having records for duration times t and s respectively, if 
sata ji   then jsit zz  . 
 
We model the probability of default (PD) for each account i at time t as 
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where k and l are fixed lags on BVs and MVs respectively; and φ  is a vector transformation 
function of duration that is used to build a parametric survival model; specifically, we use the 
transformation     22 log,log,, ttttt φ .    is an intercept, and 4321  ,,, ββββ  are vectors of 
coefficients to be estimated. F is a given cumulative distribution function.  We use the logit 
function  xexF  11)(  .  The vintage effect is introduced by using indicator variables in iw .  
 
We ensure that the underlying panel data are constrained by the condition in Eq. (1): that is, no 
observations are recorded after the first default on any account.  Given this condition, the model 
is a proportional odds discrete survival model, with the failure event defined as a default.  It can 
be estimated using standard maximum likelihood estimation for logistic regression (Allison, 
1995).   
 
Coefficient estimates on the duration  tφ  give a baseline hazard.  If indicator variables are 
included for each discrete time, then this would parallel the commonly used Cox proportional 
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hazard model.  However, having so many indicator variables would make the model difficult to 
estimate efficiently, even with a large sample. Published studies have suggested that there is a 
common shape to the distribution over duration time of default hazard rates: they rise sharply 
within the first few months, then fall steadily over the remaining duration of the account (Gross 
& Souleles, 2002, Figure 1; and Andreeva, 2006, Figure 1).  We use a parametric form for φ  
which allows us to capture this structure of the hazard over time.  Log terms are included in 
order to allow this structure to take a skewed shape.  The estimated survival probability of an 
individual i at some time t is given as the product of the probability of not failing at each time 
period, conditional on not having failed previously.  That is, 
   


t
s
isi PtS
1
1ˆ .    (2) 
The failure probability  tSiˆ1  then gives the PD at time t, which corresponds to the usual 
measure of PD, and can be used in further analysis at either the account or portfolio level, both 
for credit scoring and for computing capital requirements. 
 
To compare the performances of different model components such as BVs and MVs, we 
consider the following special cases of Eq. (1): 
1. duration only: fix 432  ,, βββ  to zero; 
2. AV only: fix 43  ,ββ  to zero; 
3. AV and BV only: fix 4 β  to zero; 
4. AV, BV and MV: all coefficients are estimated. 
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The lag k on the BVs restricts the range of forecasts that can be made by the model, since a 
period k after our observation date, there will no longer be any behavioural data available to 
make estimates.  For example, if the lag is 6 months, then we can only forecast using the BV 
model up to 6 months ahead.  Clearly, the longer the period we can forecast forward, the better.  
However, we would expect that if longer lags were used, the forecast performance would 
deteriorate.  Therefore, we have a trade-off.  We expect forecasts of 3 to 12 months ahead to be 
useful, so we consider lags of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months.  It is also possible that some BVs may be 
endogenous variables.  For example, there may be a common underlying factor which causes 
both an increase in account balance and default.  Then, a high balance is not a cause of default, 
but it may be found to be an important driver of default in the model.  The shorter the lag period, 
the more likely this connection will be, which is a further reason for preferring longer lags. For 
this reason, we focus on a BV model with 12 month lag.  Nevertheless, we note that, although 
endogeneity affects the identification of the cause, it does not affect the forecasts, which are the 
main concern of this paper. 
 
The implications of the lag term l for the MVs are different.  The MVs can be estimated using 
standard autoregressive methods (Hamilton, 1994), or may be used with simulated values during 
stress testing.  For this reason, we can use MV values at the time of default.  In particular, since 
we define an account as being in default when it is recorded as having failed to make the 
minimum payments for three consecutive months or more, where the time window over which 
the missing payments were recorded changes over time as payments are made, we use a 3-month 
lag on MVs, to correspond to the beginning of missed payments leading to default. 
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3.2.  Forecasting procedure 
 
Credit risk models can be used to explore causal hypotheses of consumer credit behaviour; for 
example, Calhoun and Deng (2002) explore the dynamics and causes of mortgage terminations.  
However, for financial institutions and regulators, these models typically have value for 
estimating the risk to individual accounts or losses on credit portfolios.  In this way, banks can 
assess possible future losses and calculate capital requirements as buffers against adverse loss 
(Board of Governors, 2009).  It is in this forecasting capacity that we assess these models.  We 
divide the panel credit data set into an in-sample training data set T, and a post, out-of-sample 
test data set S.  Models of default are built on T and forecasts of default are evaluated on S.  The 
procedure is as follows: 
1. Given a ratio r, accounts are sampled randomly, ensuring that the ratio of the number of 
accounts in T to S is approximately r.   
2. Given an observation date  , accounts in T are right censored so that only account 
records prior to   are included (i.e.,  iat ).  
3. Accounts in S are included only if they were opened prior to   (i.e., ia ), but they 
are left-censored so  only post-observation date records are included (i.e.,  iat ). 
 
This procedure is intended to mimic the operational situation, where a model is built at a 
particular time (corresponding to the observation date) using past training data, and forecasts 
ahead for accounts that already exist on the books.  A single model is built based on the fixed 
training data T, even though the forecast period may be long enough to allow us to refresh with 
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new data, since this reflects the industry practice of using a credit scoring model for several years 
before renewal; it also allows us to report consistently on a single fixed model structure. 
 
This procedure does result in a large number of records being removed, but the random sampling 
ensures that no bias is introduced when generating the out-of-sample test set, whilst the 
censoring ensures that all predictions are forecasts.  As a practical point, financial institutions 
could also use post, in-sample data sets for forecasts, and these may well give more accurate 
results.  However, for this exercise, in order to avoid the introduction of bias, the forecasts are 
restricted to an out-of-sample data set (Granger & Huang, 1997).  
  
3.3.  Performance measures 
 
Since we are using survival models which model the time to default, the usual predictive 
performance measures for classification algorithms, such as error rates and the Gini coefficient, 
do not naturally apply, and nor do the standard residuals for regression, such as mean square 
errors.  Therefore, we use the deviance (the log-likelihood ratio) to measure the model fit for 
each model separately, and also to test the goodness-of-fit for nested models.  The contribution 
of each individual i to the log-likelihood function for discrete survival analysis using the logistic 
function is  
   
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where *it  is the last observation available for account i and *
*
iit
i PP   denotes the hazard 
probability of this last observation, remembering that only the last observation can fail within the 
survival analysis framework.  From Eqs. (2) and (5), it then follows that the deviance residual is  
  ** 1/log iiiCii PPrL   ,    (6) 
where  *ˆlog iiCi tSr   is the Cox-Snell residual and *
iit
i d  indicates default.  
 
The deviance residual is used to assess predictions at the account level.  However, our models 
can also be used to forecast at an aggregate level, e.g., across accounts within a single portfolio.  
The observed default rate for an aggregate of N accounts at a particular calendar date c is given 
by  
 
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which implies that the estimated default rate forecast given by a particular model is 
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.     (8) 
The difference   cc DDE   then gives a measure of performance for aggregate forecasts. 
 
3.4. Stress testing 
 
We consider a simulation-based stress test of default rate on an aggregate of accounts using 
Monte Carlo simulation (see for example Marrison, 2002).  Over m iterations, the procedure is as 
follows.  
1. Build a dynamic model with MVs from a training data set.  
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2. Generate a simulation of economic conditions using values of MVs based on a 
distribution of historic macroeconomic data.   
3. Simulate default events on test data by substituting the simulated MV values into the 
model. 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 m times, to build a distribution of estimated default rates (DR) over 
different economic scenarios. 
5. Use the DR distribution to compute the estimated DR, given extreme economic 
circumstances.  
Stress tests should consider unexpected but plausible events.  When m is large, a sufficient 
number of extreme events can be simulated to meet the first criteria; basing the simulations on 
historical data ensures the second.  Notice that if we assume a constant loss given default and 
exposure at default for each account, the DR distribution is proportional to the distribution of 
expected losses. Further explanations of the steps are given below. 
 
In step 1, we use the discrete survival model described in Section 3.1, although this is a general 
stress testing method, and other dynamic model structures are possible. 
 
In step 2, simulated values of MVs are drawn randomly from the available time series of historic 
MVs. However, if the structure of dependencies between the MVs is not taken into account, this 
will yield implausible scenarios and lead to misleading results.  Therefore, the Cholesky 
decomposition is used (Marrison, 2002) in order to preserve the covariance structure between 
MVs.  If V is a matrix of covariances between time series of historic macroeconomic data, then it 
is decomposed by a lower triangular matrix L, such that TLLV  .  Then, if u  is a sequence of 
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values generated independently from the standard normal distribution, Luz *  will follow the 
covariance structure of V, and so can be used as plausible economic simulations. The Cholesky 
decomposition assumes that the variables are normally distributed.  However, this is not usually 
the case for MVs, and so we apply a transformation to MVs prior to simulation, if required.  
Therefore, a Box-Cox transformation is used, since this often produces an approximately normal 
distribution (Box & Cox, 1964).  Alternatively, an empirical probit transformation is used to 
impose a normal distribution on the historical data prior to using a Cholesky decomposition. 
 
In step 3, given a simulated vector of MVs, *z , and using the latent variable model of logistic 
regression (Verbeek: 2004, Section 7.1.3), a default event for observation i is simulated as  
      0ˆ*ˆˆˆˆI 4321   iTTktiTiTit etd βzβxβwβφ , 
where  I  is the indicator function, and the error  ie  is simulated from the distribution of the 
link function F. Then, using Eq. (7), the simulated DR for a calendar time period c is computed 
as 
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where     Nee ,,1 e  is a vector of N independent error terms, each of which is cumulatively 
distributed as F. The simulation takes into consideration the error in the model, e , along with 
changes in macroeconomic conditions.  This is natural, since otherwise the point predictions of 
Eq. (8) are assumed to be exactly correct.  Notice also that the fixed iw  and lagged itx  variables 
are not simulated, since they are known and are available from the account data. 
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In step 4, multiple simulations of jz  and je  are made for j = 1 to m, leading to a series of m 
estimates of DR,  jjcD ez  ,ˆ , which form an empirical distribution. For a further discussion, 
suppose that the simulations are ordered by descending values of the estimated DR; i.e., for all 
jh  ,    jjchhc eDeD  ,ˆ,ˆ zz .   
 
In step 5, extreme values are computed for stress testing. We consider two measures: Value at 
Risk (VaR) and expected shortfall. VaR is defined as the maximum expected loss, within a 
certain time period, for a given percentile, q, and the VaR (at 100(1 – q)%) of DR here is 
approximated as 
   
 qmqmcD ez  ,ˆ . However, VaR captures the worst loss in normal 
circumstances, whereas stress tests should consider losses during unusual circumstances.  
Therefore, VaR may not be an appropriate measure of loss during adverse conditions, and may 
be too conservative (BIS, 2005).  For this reason, we also consider the expected shortfall as a 
measure of loss.  This is given as the expected DR in the upper q percentile of the DR 
distribution, for a given q.  Therefore, the Monte Carlo approximation of the expected shortfall 
DR is 
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The number of iterations m is chosen so that both the VaR and expected shortfall converge to 
stable values.   
4. Data 
 
   
 17 of 41 
4.1. Credit card data 
 
We have three large data sets of UK credit card data covering the period from 1999 to mid-2006 
and comprising over 750,000 accounts.  All of the data sets include AVs taken at the time of 
application, along with monthly account behavioural records.  Most of the data are collected in 
the same way and have the same objective meaning between credit card products, although the 
distributions vary, since different products will have different demographic and risk profiles.  
Some of the data have already been used for analysis by Bellotti and Crook (2012). Variables 
that may be defined differently for each product have not been used. A list of the variables used 
is given in Table 4.  Categorical variables for employment and payment status are included as a 
series of indicator variables.  Age is divided into a series of age category indicator variables, 
since age has a non-linear relationship with default.  All of the monetary values, such as income 
and balance, are given as log values, in order to normalize their distributions.  There is a small 
proportion of missing values in the monthly payment amount, so an indicator variable for these 
values is also included.  Also, there is a large proportion of zero values for some BVs, such as 
payment amount, sales amount and APR, so indicator variables are included for those cases too.  
In these experiments, we define an account as being in default when it is recorded as having 
failed to make the minimum payments for three consecutive months or more, where the time 
window over which the missing payments were recorded changes over time as payments are 
made.  This is a common definition in the industry, and follows the Basel II convention of 90 
days delinquency for consumer credit (BCBS 2006).  The data which we use for our analysis are 
commercially sensitive, and therefore we cannot provide further details or data description 
statistics, or report the observed default rates.  It is possible that two or more credit card accounts 
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may relate to the same person. However, we expect this to be very rare, and unlikely to affect 
model specification significantly. 
 
To assess the forecasts, an observation date of 1 January 2005 is set.  Since the dataset runs to 
mid-2006, this provides up to 18 months of test data, which is a good period for forecasts, whilst 
allowing for a long run of training data.  After censoring, using the procedure described in 
Section 2.2, this gives over 400,000 and 150,000 accounts in the training and test sets 
respectively, thus providing sufficient observations for training whilst leaving a good number of 
accounts out-of-sample for forecasting.   
 
4.2. Historic UK macroeconomic data 
 
We consider several UK MVs which we expected to have an effect on the PD.  These are listed 
in Table 1.  Bellotti and Crook (2009) found that bank interest rates, earnings, the production 
index and the house price were statistically significant explanatory variables of UK defaults, so 
we include these.  The production index is used instead of GDP because it is available monthly, 
whereas the GDP figures are only provided quarterly.  Gerardi et al (2008) also found the 
unemployment rate to be significant for US defaults, and in a study of a number of stressed credit 
markets worldwide, using a dynamic model, Breeden and Thomas (2008) found that variables 
for consumer sales and prices were correlated with default and bankruptcy.  Therefore, we also 
include MVs for these risk factors.  In addition, the FTSE index and a consumer confidence 
index are also included, since they may be good indicators of confidence in the economy.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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To remove seasonality, we took twelve-month differences of the MVs. In addition, log values are 
taken for the MVs with clear exponential growth: earnings, FTSE and house prices. For stress 
testing, historical values of MVs from 1986 to 2004 are taken; i.e., only MV data prior to the 
observation date are included.  
 
The observation date of 1 January, 2005, gives training data between 1999 and 2004. During this 
period, there were moderate changes in the economy: the production index rose in 1999 and 
peaked in 2000 (104.7), after which time it dropped (to 97.3), then stayed steady over the 
remaining period (ending at 101); the unemployment rate was generally falling in 1999 (from 
1,800,000 to 1,431,000), after which it rose slightly in 2003 (to 1,561,000), before falling again 
(to 1,400,000); bank interest rates fell from 6% in 1999 to 3.5% in 2003, before rising back to 
4.75% in 2004.  Table 2 summarizes the MV statistics for this model build period only. 
Inevitably, in contrast to Table 1, the standard deviations on the variables are smaller (by 
approximately half), but still show some movement in values over the model training period. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
5. Results 
 
We present our results in five subsections.  Firstly, we present the underlying hazard rate for 
default.  Secondly, we discuss coefficient estimates from the model build.  Thirdly, we present 
the model fit and forecasting results at the account level.  Fourthly, we give forecast results at the 
aggregate level.  Lastly, we present results for stress testing. 
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5.1. Hazard rate for default 
The duration-only model provides initial baseline hazards.  Figure 1 shows the shape of the 
hazard probability over time.  It has the typical survival profile for consumer credit: PD peaks 
early, at 8 months, then slowly declines over time, as those who are highly likely to default drop 
out.  This structure has been reported previously by others; see for example Gross and Souleles 
(2002) and Andreeva (2006).  Figure 1 also shows a second small increase in the hazard, peaking 
at around 36 months.  This is because, for all credit card products, accounts with no recent usage 
are removed from the portfolios after two years.  Since these are typically low risk accounts, 
their removal leads to a small overall increase in the default risk. It is therefore important to 
realize that the hazard rate is not just an indication of the obligor’s propensity to default, it will 
also be influenced by periodic operational decisions made by portfolio managers.  The hazard 
probability estimate in Figure 1 is based on a sample size of over 60,000 observations for all 
months of account age (3 to 48) given on the horizontal axis. For the sake of commercial 
confidentiality, the precise number of observations for each account month cannot be given.  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
5.2. Model and coefficient estimates 
 
Many AVs and BVs and several MVs are statistically significant explanatory variables.  We 
focus on the model for the BV lag 12 months, since this is the most practically valuable model in 
terms of the forecast range.  Table 3 shows coefficient estimates for this model.   We find the 
following key outcomes.  
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1. The signs on the current balance (log) and its square are opposite, but the positive sign on the 
square term dominates.  Therefore, the balance outstanding on the account has an increasing 
positive effect on the default hazard.  This is unsurprising, since a larger balance will be more 
difficult to clear. Second, an increase in the credit limit reduces the hazard.  Initially, this 
may appear surprising, since we might argue that a high credit limit encourages a higher 
balance, and therefore a greater risk.  However, at least in the short term, a high credit limit 
provides the obligor with a buffer, enabling the obligor to build up debts before reaching 
default.   
2. The bank sets the credit limit based on their own assessment of the obligor’s behaviour, so 
the credit limit acts partly as a proxy for a behavioural score.    
3. The amount paid back each month, indicated by the payment status and amount, has a 
negative effect on default.  This is to be expected, since a greater ability to repay implies that 
default is less likely.  
4. The number of transactions has a positive effect on default.  This is to be expected, since it 
indicates a greater card usage, and hence a rising balance.  However, interestingly, the 
transaction sales amount has a negative effect.  A possible explanation is that the sales 
amount acts as an indicator of wealth, when taken together with the number of transactions.  
That is, people who make a few big purchases are more likely to be wealthier, and therefore 
more able to repay, than those who make many small purchases.  
5. When behavioural data are missing, PD decreases considerably.  However, since no duration 
times up to 12 months will have BVs (because of the lag), this is mainly a joint effect with 
duration.  
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6. Indicator variables have been added for vintage, indicating the year of account opening.  
These are significant, implying that cohorts explain some of the effects over time for default 
rates within the data set.  This is natural, since lenders will allow new accounts with higher or 
lower levels of risk onto their books at different times, depending on their changing attitude 
to risk at different times in the business cycle. 
7. Concerning macroeconomic variables, the interest rate has a positive effect on default.  This 
is to be expected, since rising interest rates imply a greater demand for repayment on 
outstanding loans and mortgages, which will have an adverse effect on people who are more 
highly indebted. The unemployment rate also has a positive effect on default.  The 
unemployment rate is an indicator of the direct economic stress on individuals.  In particular, 
obligors who become or remain unemployed will find it more difficult to repay their debt.  
Conversely, if unemployment decreases, then we would generally expect unemployed 
obligors to find jobs, making it easier for them to repay.  Therefore, the effect of this MV on 
default is as expected. Only the interest and unemployment rates are statistically significant 
MVs in the model, so the model can be rebuilt without the other MVs, to determine how they 
are affecting the parameter estimates of the former. We find similar results: the interest rate 
remains significant (p < 0.0001), although its effect size is smaller (0.0615), and the 
unemployment rate is also significant (p < 0.0001), but its effect size is approximately 
unchanged (0.000621). 
 
The first three findings corroborate the results of Gross and Souleles (2002), who built dynamic 
models of default for US credit card data.  They found that the risk of default rises with the 
balance and falls with repayments.  They used utilization (the outstanding balance divided by the 
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credit limit) instead of the raw value of the balance, which is sensible, given the relationship 
discussed in point 2.   
 
The shape of the relationship which we find between the baseline hazard and the duration of 
holding the card is consistent with that of other studies, but we find the baseline hazard to be at a 
maximum at a duration time of 8 months, whereas Gross and Souleles (2002), who also consider 
credit cards, found it to be around 18 months (see their Figure 1). Calhoun and Deng (2002, 
Exhibit 2) and Willen et al (2007, Figure 12) both consider mortgages and find that the 
maximum hazard occurs at between 16 and 28 quarters. One possible reason for the difference 
between our results and those of Gross and Souleles may be that American card holders hold 
more cards than UK card holders, and so spread their outstanding balance over more cards. 
 
The findings for the MVs are generally consistent with those of other comparable studies. As in 
our study, significant positive effects of the unemployment rate have been found by both Gross 
and Souleles (2002) when modelling the probability of bankruptcy, and Willen et al. (2008) 
when modelling the probability of mortgage default. Bellotti and Crook (2009), using a different 
data set, also found a positive sign for unemployment, but it was not significant. Gross and 
Souleles (for bankruptcy), Willen et al., and Bellotti and Crook all found a positive and 
significant effect for interest rates, consistent with our result in point 7. However, when Gross 
and Souleles (2002) modelled delinquency by credit card holders using a definition very similar 
to that which we use for default, they did not find that either the unemployment rate or house 
prices were significant predictors. There are a range of differences between our study and that of 
Gross and Souleles that might account for this difference in findings. Gross and Souleles had a 
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different set of covariates, and their estimation period was much shorter than ours. Their training 
data covered only two years, whereas ours extended over at least five years, and so potentially 
included more information about the relationship between the default probability and the 
unemployment rate (they did not include an interest rate). Our training data also covers a 
different period (1999–2006) to their data (mid-1995 to mid-1997). 
 
 The correlations we find with the unemployment rate are also consistent with the study by 
Breeden and Thomas (2008), who use several world-wide data sets, although they also found the 
GDP to be significant in many cases. We did not include this variable because we were using 
monthly data and the GDP is not available monthly. They also included vintage effects in their 
models.  
 
Univariate associations for each MV are also reported in Table 4. This indicates that almost all 
MVs have an association with default. However, these MVs are correlated with one another, so 
they do not all come out as significant variables in the multivariate model. 
 
These results are for the model with BVs lagged 12 months.  We found similar results for models 
with shorter lag periods, and the comments made above also hold in these cases, except that the 
effects and statistical significance tend to be stronger for models with shorter lags. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
TABLE 4 HERE 
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5.3. Model fit and forecasts of time to default 
 
Model fits for several alternative models are shown in Figure 2.  This shows a general 
improvement in model fit as we move from the simple duration-only model to the AV-only 
model to the AV and BV model.  In addition, we also observe that the model fit improves with 
shorter lags on the BVs, with a relatively large improvement at a 3-month lag.  However, as we 
have discussed, this improvement comes at the price of a much shorter range of forecasts.  We 
can see in Figure 2 that, although some of the MVs are statistically significant, their contribution 
to model  fit is weak.  The fit of the nested model is also assessed, with the results shown in 
Table 5.  This shows that all model extensions lead to a statistically significant improvement in 
fit, particularly the basic duration time only model and the inclusion of BVs and MVs. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
 
Figure 2 also shows the results of the forecasts.  These follow the model fit results very closely.  
They show a marked improvement in fit for the BV models, improving with shorter lags.  
However, there is no noticeable change in forecast accuracy when MVs are included.   
5.4. Estimation of default rates 
 
Figure 3 shows the estimated monthly default rates for various different models, along with the 
observed (or true) monthly default rates for each month of the test data set.  The observed default 
rates have high variance, but there is a general trend of high rates beginning in 2005, falling 
during 2005, then rising again in 2006.  The AV model is able to model the general fall in default 
rates, but BVs are required to forecast the overall trend, including the rise in 2006.  However, the 
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best forecasts indicating a high DR in early 2005 and mid-2006, whilst also forecasting the dip in 
default rates at the end of 2005, are only made when MVs are included in the model. The BV 
model, lag 3 months, also performs well, but this is not surprising, given the short forecast 
period, using behavioural data just one month before accounts begin missing payments.  Overall, 
the BV lag 12 month model with MVs performs best at forecasting the aggregate DR, achieving 
better results than even BV models with shorter lags, as demonstrated in Table 6. 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
TABLE 6 HERE 
5.5. Stress test results 
 
We ran Monte Carlo simulations using the MV model given in Table 3.  The estimated DR was 
simulated on the test data set, 12 months after the observation date; i.e., for December 2005.  A 
stable default rate distribution was generated after m = 25,000 simulations, and is shown in 
Figure 4.  Notice, firstly, that the observed DR is positioned centrally within the distribution, 
close to the median. This demonstrates that this period did not represent extreme default rates. 
The right-hand tail shows the risk for more adverse conditions.  In particular, we have included 
the figure for expected shortfall at the 99th percentile. This shows that, for the worst 1% of 
economic scenarios we consider, the expected DR is 1.73 times greater than normal conditions 
(i.e., the median estimated DR).  The VaR is also shown for comparison.  We see that this gives 
a lower estimate of DR (1.59 times the median), which may not reflect extreme circumstances 
sufficiently.  These figures are slightly higher than those suggested as part of the US stress 
testing exercise by the Board of Governors (2009).  In particular, the Board of Governors study 
estimates a more modest rise in DR of between 20% and 55%, when contrasting a normal 
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“baseline” figure to “more adverse” conditions.1 However, our results appear lower than those of 
Rösch and Scheule (2004), who found the VaR for US credit cards to be 2.31 times the mean, 
although they used aggregate data, not account level data. 
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Dynamic models form a flexible approach to modelling and forecasting consumer credit risk. 
They have a number of well-known advantages over static models, including modelling the 
conditional PD in a specific time period rather than in a time window, and enabling the 
prediction of the profitability of specific loans (Bellotti & Crook, 2009).  In particular, we have 
used discrete-time survival analysis to model  credit card risk.  This has two main advantages.  
Firstly, it is a principled means of building dynamic models of default using accounting records; 
and, secondly, modelling and forecasting are computationally efficient when compared to 
continuous-time survival models.  This is important when model builders use large databases of 
credit accounts. 
 
We have used a large data set of UK credit card accounts to test the effectiveness of discrete 
survival models with BVs and MVs as models of default.    Unlike the previous literature, we 
explore the use of these models as tools for risk measurement, forecasting and stress testing. We 
                                                 
1 The Board of Governors (2009) gives baseline two-year loss rates as 12–17%, and “more adverse” rates as 18–
20%.  Taking the lower and upper bounds of each range and converting to an average monthly DR gives a 20–55% 
expected increase in loss.  Taking a mean value for the baseline and more adverse rates (14.5% and 19% 
respectively) gives a mean increase of 34%. 
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conclude that many BVs are statistically significant explanatory variables of default, and 
including them gives improved model fit.  Important BVs are the account balance, repayments, 
the number of transactions within each month, and the credit limit.  We find that an improved 
model fit translates into improved forecasts of the time to default.  The performance improves 
with shorter lags on BVs.  This is to be expected, since shorter lags imply that the model is using 
more recent information about the obligors.  However, we also note that shorter lags imply 
shorter ranges of forecasts and greater levels of endogeneity between BVs and the default event.  
For this reason, we focus on lag 12 month BVs.  This gives an improved performance relative to 
the AV only model, and also allows for useful forecasts up to 12 months ahead.  
 
We found that bank interest rates and the unemployment rate affect the hazard significantly.  
Whilst their inclusion gave only a modest improvement in model fit and no noticeable 
improvement in forecasts of the time to default at the account level, their inclusion improves 
forecasts of default rate at the aggregate level.  This is understandable, since MVs affect all 
predicted PDs, rather than at the individual account level.  Hence, their effect will only become 
noticeable at the aggregate level where accounts are taken together. Where they are comparable, 
our results corroborate the results obtained by others (Gross & Souleles, 2002; Calhoun & Deng, 
2002; Gerardi et al., 2008). 
 
Third, the inclusion of MVs enables us to use stress tests, which generate credible results, 
indicating that adverse conditions may raise the default rate by around 79%.  We used a 
simulation-based approach for our experiments, but scenarios could also be designed and used 
with these models. 
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The following further issues are suggested as developments from this study: 
1. The data cover a period of relatively benign economic conditions (1999–2006), although 
there is some evidence of UK default rates increasing toward the end of this period. It would 
be interesting to follow up this study using new data through the period of the credit crunch 
(2008–2010) and beyond. Nevertheless, this study shows that credible models with 
macroeconomic variables can be built using data from less extreme economic conditions. It 
may well be that a model change occurs after the credit crunch period, in which case it would 
be beneficial to have separate  models built across the pre- and post- credit crunch periods.   
2. The inclusion of MVs may explain some of the correlations between accounts over calendar 
time. However, it is possible that not all borrower correlations are explained, and a latent 
variable over time may be of benefit. This was suggested by Bellotti and Crook (2012), who 
implement an asset correlation model and show that including MVs explains some of the 
correlation, but not all. 
3. In this paper, we have investigated the problem of forecasting and stress testing default rates. 
However, economic capital is often defined as the difference between the VaR and the mean 
of the Expected Loss distribution. The calculation of the Expected Loss for an obligor 
involves a model of loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD), as well as PD, 
along with their correlations. In effect, this paper assumes a constant LGD and EAD. An 
interesting development of this work would be to explore the role of a discrete survival 
model within the scope of this larger problem. 
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Table 1.   
Descriptive statistics and sources for macroeconomic variables for the period 1986 to 2004. 
Macroeconomic Variable Source Descriptive statistics 
(for difference in value over 12 months) 
Min Mean SD Max 
UK bank interest rates ONS –4.5 –0.387 1.89 6.5 
UK unemployment rate (in ‘000s) SA ONS –535 –91.2 232 575 
UK production index (all)  ONS –5.2 1.09 2.26 6 
Retail sales value ONS 0.3 3.92 1.46 8.5 
FTSE 100 all share index FTSE –822 85.1 280 682 
Halifax House Price index  LBG –9.37% +8.64% 9.98% +34.7% 
Retail price index (all items)  ONS 1.2 5.02 2.23 12.8 
Earnings (log) all including bonus  ONS 0.00820 0.022 0.00786 0.0384 
Consumer confidence index  EC –20.3 0.725 7.61 18.1 
 
Sources: UK Office of National Statistics (ONS), Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) and the 
European Commission (EC).  The data are monthly and may be seasonally adjusted (SA). 
 
Table 2.   
Descriptive statistics for macroeconomic variables for the period of model build: 1999 to 
2004. 
Macroeconomic Variable Descriptive statistics 
(for difference in value over 12 months) 
Min Mean SD Max 
UK bank interest rates –2.5 –0.469 1.06 1.25 
UK unemployment rate (in ‘000s) SA –207 –61.8 70.6 102 
UK production index (all)  –4.7 0.0458 2.01 3.7 
Retail sales value 0.7 4.21 1.79 8.5 
FTSE 100 all share index –822 –64.4 380 568 
Halifax House Price index  +1.63% +14.3% 6.83% +31.5% 
Retail price index (all items)  1.2 3.97 1.4 6.4 
Earnings (log) all including bonus  0.00895 0.0178 0.00398 0.0316 
Consumer confidence index  –12.6 –0.0667 4.96 10.4 
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Table 3. 
Coefficient estimates for the model with all AVs, BVs lag 12 months and MVs.   
Covariate Estimate Standard 
error 
Intercept n/a **  
Duration 1.35 ** 0.0467  
      “      (squared) –0.00698 ** 0.0003  
      “      (log) 16.4 ** 0.467  
      “      (log squared) –6.42 ** 0.198  
Selected application variables (AV)  
Time customer with bank (years) –0.00250 ** 0.000084  
Time with bank unknown + –0.342 ** 0.0321  
Income (log) –0.146 ** 0.0127  
Income unknown + –1.46 ** 0.123  
Number of cards –0.0610 ** 0.00782  
Time at current address –0.00129 0.000973 
Employment + :     
 Self-employed 0.303 ** 0.0244 
 Homemaker  0.072 0.0512 
 Retired  0.111 0.0452 
 Student –0.035 0.0431 
 Unemployed 0.231 0.113 
 Part time –0.365 ** 0.0383 
 Other –0.037 0.0253 
Excluded category: Employed   
Age + : 18 to 24 0.074 0.0301 
 25 to 29 –0.058 0.0283 
 30 to 33 0.010 0.0288 
 34 to 37 0.100 ** 0.0287 
 38 to 41 0.046 0.0302 
 48 to 55 –0.108 ** 0.0307 
 56 and over –0.243 ** 0.0381 
 unknown –2.74 ** 0.0548 
Excluded category: 42 to 47   
Credit bureau score –0.00322 ** 0.000043 
Product + : A 0.535 ** 0.0273 
  B 0.371 ** 0.0189 
Excluded category: C   
Vintage (+): 1999-2003 n/a **  
Behavioural variables (BV) lag 12 months  
Payment status + :   
 Fully paid –0.390 ** 0.0535 
Greater than minimum paid –0.090 ** 0.0271 
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 Minimum paid 0.149 ** 0.0345 
 Less than minimum paid 0.714 ** 0.0445 
 Unknown –0.148 * 0.0496 
Excluded category: No payment   
Current balance (log) –1.58 ** 0.0923 
     “  (log squared) 0.517 ** 0.0184 
     “ is zero + –1.05 ** 0.123 
     “ is negative + –0.802 ** 0.137 
Credit limit (log) –1.22 ** 0.0273 
Payment amount (log) –0.154 ** 0.025 
     “ is zero + –0.133 0.0535 
     “ is unknown + –0.452 ** 0.0706 
Number of months past due 0.134 * 0.0459 
Past due amount (log) 0.0795 0.0605 
 “ is zero + –0.623 ** 0.0981 
Number of transactions 0.00663 ** 0.00193 
Transaction sales amount (log) –0.350 ** 0.0246 
 “ is zero + –0.567 ** 0.0489 
APR on purchases –0.00487 0.00194 
 “ is zero + –0.482 ** 0.0438 
Behavioural data is missing + –3.73 ** 0.123 
Macroeconomic variables (MV) lag 3 months  
Bank interest rate 0.113 ** 0.019 
Unemployment rate 0.000672 ** 0.000246 
Production index –0.0101 0.0063 
FTSE all 100 (log) 0.0591 0.0743 
Earnings (log) 1.57 2.11 
Retail sales 0.00929 0.00504 
House price (log) –0.218 0.656 
Consumer confidence  –0.00217 0.00197 
Retail price index (RPI) –0.0298 0.0151 
 
a) Indicator variables are denoted by a plus sign (+).   
b) Statistical significance levels are denoted by asterisks: ** is less than 0.001 and * is less 
than 0.01.   
c) Coefficient estimates on the intercept and vintages are not shown, for reasons of 
commercial confidentiality.  Only selected application variables are included, for the 
same reason. 
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Table 4. 
Coefficient estimates for the univariate association between the MVs and default.   
 
Macroeconomic variables (MV) lag 3 months 
 Estimate  Standard error 
Bank interest rate 0.0865 ** 0.00791 
Unemployment rate 0.000287  ** 0.000098 
Production index 0.000849     0.00352 
FTSE all 100 (log) 0.334  ** 0.0372 
Earnings (log) –0.280  1.67 
Retail sales 0.0349  ** 0.00372 
House price (log) 3.25  ** 0.300 
Consumer confidence  0.00947  ** 0.0014 
Retail price index (RPI) 0.0311  ** 0.00528 
Statistical significance levels are denoted by asterisks: ** is less than 0.001 and * is less 
than 0.01.   
Table 5. 
Model fit.  
Nested model Compared to 
base model 
Difference 
in 2 × LLR 
Number of 
added 
covariates  
p-value 
Duration only Null model 2438 4 <0.0001 
AV only Duration only 22531 34 <0.0001 
AV & BV lag 12 AV only 9237 22 <0.0001 
AV, BV lag 12 & MV lag 3 AV & BV lag 12 47 9 <0.0001 
AV & BV lag 9 AV only 7946 22 <0.0001 
AV & BV lag 6 AV only  12458 22 <0.0001 
AV & BV lag 3 AV only 26559 22 <0.0001 
 
The results are for nested models using the difference in LLR and a chi-square significance test. 
 
 
Table 6. 
Mean absolute difference between the estimated and observed default rates across the test 
set.  
Model Mean absolute difference between 
estimated and observed DR 
AV only 0.087 
BV lag 12 0.058 
BV lag 12 & MV lag 3 0.049 
BV lag 9 0.062 
BV lag 6 0.070 
BV lag 3 0.068 
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These results relate to models based on the 18 months of test results shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 1. 
Baseline hazard rate function for the parametric duration model of default. 
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For reasons of commercial confidentiality, the hazard probability scale is not shown. 
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Figure 2.   
Model fit and forecast performance for different models. 
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Figure 3.  
Comparison of estimated and observed default rates for each month of the test data set.   
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For reasons of commercial confidentiality, the scale on the default rate axis is not shown. 
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Figure 4.   
Distribution of estimated default rates 
 
 
The distribution is based on a simulation of economic scenarios for credit card accounts during 
December 2005, based on a model with MVs trained on data prior to January 2005, shown as a 
histogram.  The observed DR for the test data set is shown, along with the Value at Risk (VaR) 
and expected shortfall at 99% probability.  All values are expressed as a ratio of the median 
estimated DR. 
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